.
There are three arguments for profit sharing that are frequently advanced (see Blanchflower and Oswald (1987a) and Estrin, Grout and Wadhwani (1987) .
First, it is claimed that profit sharing increases productivity by inducing changes in workers' attitudes toward the firm (for example, see Fawcett (18651, and Ely (1889) . Morale will improve, thereby increasing effort and reducing absenteeism and labor turnover. Lower turnover would reduce training costs and might be accompanied by more firm-specific human capital. If profit sharing raises the average product of labor, then a profit sharing firm will, other things equal, employ fewer workers at a given level of output.
The productivity augmenting effects of profit sharing is disputed by Jensen and Meckling (1979) , who argue that managers will have an incentive to shirk their monitoring function if workers share in the firm's profits. In addition, they predict that worker participation in decision making would also lower productivity because it would increase the cost of monitoring workers.
(However, Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) argue that workers in participatory firms might exhibit more cooperative behavior, which would reduce the cost of monitoring a worker's effort.)
The second and third arguments for profit sharing are directed more at the effects of profit sharing on the variability rather than level of employment.
This implies that employment variation over the business cycle would be less for a profit sharing firm than for a conventional fixed wage firm.
The third argument is one given in Weitzman (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986) .
Briefly, Weitzman argues that an economy populated by profit sharing firms would likely be characterized by an excess demand for labor because firms will attempt to hire workers to equate the value of the marginal product of labor to the base wage rather than to total remuneration (the sum of the base wage and the profit share bonus).
If the base wage is set sufficiently low, the demand for labor would exceed the available supply, which is determined by total remuneration. In contrast, a conventional fixed wage economy would likely be characterized by excess labor supply or by labor market clearing. The main implication of Weitzman's work is that a profit sharing system would exhibit a smaller employment response to aggregate demand shocks than a conventional fixed wage system. The second data set fixwage is for firms in the same industries which have no share features whatsoever, and, as with the share data set, firms are both large and small.4 Unfortunately, the range of the data set is confined to the period prior to 1940, which reflects data unavailability rather than the demise of these firms.
In Table I However, there is a fair amount of variation in profit sharing across firms and over time for many firms. Six firms accounting for 260 of the 2955 observations on profit sharing firms paid on average over 5% of worker's pay in the form of a bonus. The bonus exceeded 10% in at least one year for seventeen of the firms and workers at most firms did not receive a bonus in at least one year. In our sample of profit sharing firms (which includes PCs) about 46% of the board of management comprises workers (EEBD), and about 53% of the workers choose to become members (WKDL). In columns (4) and (5) we present comparative data for sharing and non-sharing firms for the period preceding the second world war. By comparing columns (2) and (4) (2) and (3) for the whole data set: sharing firms are considerably smaller, older and pay better.
III. Empirical Strategy
In analyzing the employment effects of sharing, one way of viewing our empirical strategy in this preliminary study is that we are not testing directly for productivity effects, but rather looking for evidence of an effect of sharing on employment levels, including one that arises indirectly, from productivity changes.' Specifically, we estimate employment equations that are similar to one used in the recent study by Bradley and Estrin (1987) . We will investigate whether the conclusions obtained by Bradley and Estrin are supported by our longer and richer panel data set. Also we shall see if our results on profit sharing are sensitive to how profit sharing is measured, the degree of worker participation, and the particular time period and industry under study.
We estimate a log-linear employment equation ( (1) The inclusion of a measure of (real) sales * (or output) and remuneration in equation (1) We examine the role of worker participation by augmenting equations (1) and (2) with a measure of worker participation and in the case of (2) 
where P is a proxy for worker participation in decision making. We draw on previous studies of worker participation and productivity and use two alternative proxies for worker participation in decision making --the proportion of the members of the Board who are workers (EEBD) and the proportion of the workforce who are members of the PCs in our sample (WKDL).
IV. Results
All four specifications were estimated by (OLS) .13 To conserve on space we report the ordinary least squares estimates of equation (3) only for EEBD as a proxy for employee participation in decision making.14 Results for both participation variables are given separately for versions of equation (4). We begin by discussing our empirical results for the entire sample which are presented in Table 2 .
In both the short-run and long-run, reassuringly we always find that employment varies inversely with remuneration. The second possibility will be investigated below by estimating the specifications only for the larger firms in our sample.
The OLS estimates of equations (2) and (4) Since the sample period covers more than 70 years for some firms in our data set, we examine the sensitivity of our results by estimating our specifications separately for pre-World War II (Table 3 ) and post-World War II (Table 4) observations.21
In general, the results obtained with prewar data are broadly similar to those reported in Table 2 and hence we discuss only the main differences. The most important one arises when equation (4) (1) and (2) (2) and (4) in Table 5 . 24
There are a number of important differences between the results given in Table 5 and the corresponding results given in A partial explanation for the difference between our relatively small employment effects and those obtained by Bradley and Estrin is that the bonus paid by the John Lewis Partnership accounted for a larger fraction of workers' income (13% to 24%) than is true for a typical sharing firm in our sample.
Since the bonus paid by a typical firm in Estrin and Wilson sample is around 3% of average pay, which is similar to the practice of our sharing firms, the importance of the bonus does not help reconcile our results with those of Estrin and Wilson.2' It is also possible that Estrin and Wilson and Bradley and Estrin obtained larger estimated effects because they studied cash-based profit sharing while many of the profit sharing firms in our study distributed the bonus in the form of shares. As we noted above, Blanchflower and Oswald (1987b) found that employee share ownership schemes did not have a significant effect on employment. Thus, the form of the profit sharing plan appears to matter.
Finally, our results suggest that the effects of profit sharing may depend crucially on aspects of institutional setting in addition to profit sharing.
In many of our specifications, the point estimates indicate that worker participation in decision making had an important influence on the employment effect of profit sharing. For example, the fixed effects results given in Table 5 show that the employment effects of profit sharing are greater if there is no worker participation in decision making. Clearly, there is a need for additional research on alternative sharing arrangements to try to determine which organizational structures promote favorable economic outcomes. Profit sharing data was limited to profit sharing pension plans; no data were available on cash-only plans. Two (alternative) measures of profit sharing were used --a dummy variable and the percent of employees covered. Kruse found that the response of employment to changes in the (national) civilian unemployment rate was lower for profit sharing firms and for some specifications significantly so for firms in the manufacturing sector. This is an issue to which we will return in a future study.
2As such the data are at least as good as others that have been used in related work on sharing firms, such as for European producer coops (Estrin, Jones and Svejnar, 1987) and US PCs (Conte and Jones, 1985) .
3Since data on some variables are missing for some observations, the most observations from a single firm used in the*empirical work reported below is 77.
4Data are for productive plants that are affiliated to the cooperative wholesale society. For a discussion of these enterprises see Carr-Saunders, Florence and Peers (1938) .
SThe combined data sets contain over 4000 observations on some variables. 90ne limitation of our data sets is that we have information only on total employment rather than total hours worked. However, this shortcoming also characterizes the data used in Bradley and Estrin (19871, Estrin and Wilson (1986) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1987b), and Kruse (1987 21As noted above, our sample of conventional wage firms does not extend into the post-World War II period, and therefore, the results reported in Table   4 are for sharing firms only. Thus we were unable to estimate equations (1) and (3) for the latter period.
22It is appropriate to compare the estimated models with the industry production variables to the results in Table 4 
